June rate hike? What Yellen (and the Fed) faces…

I have to admit that by just looking at the government bond yields (see appendix), I am asking myself a lot of questions about the stability of the economy and the financial markets. However, one particular point that matters the most is the Fed’s June rate hike.

Therefore, this article aims to give an update on the four major risks that can lift-off the central bank’s monetary policy decision for later this year, which are the following topics:

  • China slowdown
  • Dollar strength
  • Oil prices
  • Grexit: Greece and all its 2015 payments
  1. China Slowdown

It is clear that commodity prices have dropped dramatically over the past year based on a lower than expected Chinese growth (i.e. global demand). If we look at the last figures, analysts expect China to grow by approximately 7% in 2015, down from the last 7.5% projection (in late 2014). Last week, we saw that the economic output grew 7% YoY in the three months of 2015, down from 7.3% in Q4 last year and now standing at its slowest rate in six years. What really concerns me is that I read several times the word ‘approximately’ in analysts predictions of China 2015 growth, this means that we could see an actual lower than 7% figure, especially in the middle of this geopolitical war.

In the housing market, it looks like the economy is experiencing a sort of ‘real’ correction: if we look at on of Chinese Housing Market ‘benchmark’ – China 70-city Home price change – the last report showed that house prices decreased 6.1% YoY in March, its eighth negative print in a row and the biggest drop in history.

It is hard to believe that after a 15tr USD increase in total Chinese Bank assets since September 2008, the economy is still struggling to achieve a healthy growth. The obvious response from Beijing officials was to cut its Reserve Requirements Ratio by 1% to 18.5% (last one was a 50bp cut in early February), ‘flooding the market’ with liquidity and participating – like the rest of the World – to this massive monetary stimulus.

What the PoBC cut a sort of ‘preparation’ to the Fed’s action?

Maybe I know too little about the Chinese economy (and history), but it is curious too see that some financial experts have a totally different interpretation of China.

For instance, in the last discussion that I had with a (very) experienced economist, I asked him ‘Where do you see the most interesting opportunities at the moment for medium term investments?’

He answered me: ‘Well, there are three countries you should invest in: China, China and China!’ He started his quick analysis about the massive internal migration of young new dwellers moving from rural to towns and cities (between 10 and 20 million each year according to NBS). Chinese major cities will host approximately 60% of the country’s total population (permanent urban residents) by 2020 (slightly above 50% now), therefore playing in favor of Chinese Fixed assets, companies’ valuation,… However, I was asking myself: ‘What about work conditions and salary increase? We learned from the last GFC that you can’t reach a sustainable economy with a divergence between median annual incomes and home prices. In addition, you can’t build a strong economy based on speculative stories and artificial growth (look at the Spanish situation now after the correction in the housing market).

Moreover, this scenario was based on a strong assumption that relations between China and the US remain stable (i.e. no pressure from the West to abolish the exchange rate peg). This is clearly not obvious, especially in this new (sort of) Cold War between East and West. If we look at the US Treasury website, we can see that China has reduced its US Treasuries by 50bn USD over the past year (its US holdings stand at 1.224Tr USD as of February). If this trend continues, pressure from US officials to drop the peg will be more and more a serious debate.

Besides that digression, it seems that we are going to see some downward revision in China, which will obviously be a persistent topic at the next FOMC statements.

  1. Dollar strength

The topic that I love to discuss is the Dollar strength. Described as the most crowded trade of the year, it is clear that a constant strengthening greenback will be problematic for the US economy, especially now that the Fed has stepped out of the bond market. Even though we saw a sharp reduction of the government’s deficit in the last two fiscal years (the annual US budget deficit fell from 1.1tr USD for FY12 to 483bn USD for FY2014 as you can see it in the chart below – equivalent to 2.8% of the country’s GDP), the US still runs large current account deficits (coming from consistent trade deficits) which forces them to rely on external funding.


(Source: WSJ)

A strong dollar wouldn’t help to ‘redress’ the balance of trade (i.e. exports are less competitive), and will obviously decline companies’ sales and reduce the economic output. Pessimist Atlanta Fed forecast a zero-percent growth for the first three months of this year, down from 1.9% in early February. The market is more bullish anticipating a 1.4% rise.

The July Fed Funds Futures implied rate is at 15bp, while September and December are trading at 21bp and 34.5bp respectively. From that perspective, I will opt for a September move (vs. June).

  1. Oil prices

As you know, oil prices fell sharply in the second half of last year, bringing to an end a four-year period of stability around $105 per barrel. If we look back at prices’ history since the early 80s, there has been four other relevant declines prior to this one:

  • Increase in oil supply and change in OPEC policy (1985-86)
  • US recessions after the S&L crisis in 1990-1
  • The Asian crisis of 1997
  • The Great Financial Crisis 2007 – 2008

Today, the causes of the Sharp Drop could be explained by multiple factors: a change in OPEC policy objectives (no intervention from Saudi Arabia in the last OPEC meeting on November 27th last year), increasing production (US Production of Crude Oil now stands above 9ml barrel/day, up from 5ml 7 years ago post GFC), receding geopolitical concerns about supply disruptions in the Middle East and between Russia and Ukraine, a sinking global demand and a US dollar appreciation. It is hard to define which of these factors was the most important, however I would say the expansion of oil output in North American due to the US Shale revolution (and Canada oil sands) and a declining global demand both weighed on oil prices.

Although low oil prices (and other commodities) is seen as a sort of stimulus for consumers by analysts, I am very confident that it is also the explanation of the late decrease in inflation expectations in all the Western countries. The table below shows you the Consumer Price Index of the major economies:














2.2% (February)


Even the 5y/5y forward swap rate, what central banks watch as an indication of inflation expectations, has fallen to unprecedented sub-2 percent levels in the US, which is going to be problematic as Yellen and (most of) the Fed’s Board have considered that it is time for monetary policy tightening – the so-called neutrality.

In addition, low oil prices could also be a burden for all the high leveraged shale oil companies in the US. The chart below (source Bloomberg) gives us a quick idea of where oil prices have to stand so that shale companies are (at least) breakeven. According to the sell side research, breakeven prices for US shale oil are within the $60-$65 window. WTI May futures contract is still trading below those figures at a shy $56.


(Source: Bloomberg)

  1. Grexit and the contagion effect

With the 10-year yield now trading at 13% (and the 2Y at 29%), it is clear that the market is anticipating disappointing negotiations between the new Greek party and the Troika. There are lots of good articles that came out lately about Greek’s situation, but that could easily be summarize by the chart below. This clearly shows that there are going to be a lot of meetings with European officials before the Summer, and the Tsipras government will have to innovate its list of reforms in order to free up funds and service its short-term obligations.


(Source: IMF)

What’s next then? Let’s assume Greece makes it way through the summer (the two 3bn+ payments to the ECB) without catching a cold, this is only the 2015 chart and there are plenty of more years to come. No borrowing from the financial market and an unstoppable increasing debt (see article Pocketful of Miracles). A situation that could only deteriorate in my opinion…

In the latest news, Bloomberg reported that the Greek government issued a legislative act yesterday that requires public sector entities to transfer idle cash reserves to Bank of Greece (i.e. capital controls) as the country is willing to serve its next €1bn debt obligations to the IMF next month.

To conclude, we may see a symbolic 25bp hike at the June FOMC meeting, however I am certain that we are far from the so-called long-run neutrality rate of 3.5%-4%. If the weak global macro environment persists in the medium term, we are constantly going to see downward revision in the Fed’s dot plot.

Appendix: Government bond yields


March: ECB’s painful month?

As you know, the Euro has been massively under pressure since the ECB’s May meeting last year and decreased from 1.40 to a low of 1.11 before edging back to 1.14. In my article The Euro Strength and The ECB’s options, I explained the ‘Euro strength story’ (July 2012 – May 2014) by the following three factors:

  • Narrowing peripheral-core spreads (After Draghi’s ‘Whatever it takes’ and OMT introduction)
  • Divergence between the ECB and the Fed’s balance sheet total assets
  • Current Account back into positive territories

During this ‘prosperous’ period, nothing was able to stop the Euro despite poor fundamentals (i.e. flat growth, high unemployment rate and declining inflation). Then, Draghi’s promise ‘the Council is comfortable with acting in June’ completely broke the upside trend and the market has been totally relying on the ECB’s balance sheet expansion plan. It is clear now that EZ policymakers’ goal is to see the central bank’s balance sheet expend by 1.14tr Euros within the next 18 months and reach June 2012 levels (approximately 3.1tr Euros). As you can see it on the graph below (EURUSD monthly chart), the market got really excited about this news and traders and investors have completely switch to a bearish view when it comes to EURUSD (and EURGBP). We saw that Bulge Bracket banks reviewed their EURUSD forecasts for 2015. Sell-side research predicts a EURUSD between 0.90 and 1.00 within the next 6 to 12 months. Moreover, if we have a quick look at the last CFTC’s Commitments of Traders report, ‘net speculative’ positions were approximately -186,000 in the week ending February 17, and are closely approaching June 2012 low of -215,000.

Screen Shot 02-23-15 at 12.44 AM

(Source: Oanda, CoT)

If you ask me where I see EURUSD in the long term, there is no doubt that my answer is ‘South’. With the Fed considering starting its monetary policy tightening cycle (June meeting for a first 25bps shift probably), monetary policy divergence will weigh on the currency pair in the LT and parity looks like a reasonable level to me. In addition, Grexit contagion effect to ‘scarier’ countries such as Spain could also trigger another episode of peripheral-core yield spread divergence and therefore add more selling pressure on the single currency.

However, I think that traders and investors should be careful at the moment. Over the past two weeks, volatility has dropped in the market and EURUSD has been trading within a tight 180-range (1.1270 – 1.1450). Based on the last discussions I had, some of the traders were clearly waiting for a breakout ahead of the Greek deal, therefore the 1.1270 support was carefully watched on Friday (this is the reason why I put my take profit slightly above at 1.1300, see article Pocketful of Miracles). However, the Euro looks resilient based on current market conditions and I have to admit that I see potential Euro strength in the month coming ahead. As you can see it below, EURUSD reached a 11-year low at the end of last month at 1.11 before coming back to 1.14. The Fibonacci retracements were built based on October 200 low of 0.8230 and July 2008 high of 1.6040 range. Unless contagion risk spreads to other EZ countries (i.e. higher core-peripheral risk), the bullish trend could last for a month or two (based on previous bull consolidation after sharp sell-off).

Screen Shot 02-23-15 at 12.50 AM

(Source: FXCM)

The ECB bond buying program: Ambitious plan, disappointing results?

We are aware now that the ECB has announced a round of measures in order to counter the deflationary cycle (inflation rate of -0.6% in January) and of course support investment and consumption, the two key contributors of the 19-nation economy. The last one was of course the January announcement of additional purchases (combined monthly asset purchases of 60bn Euros from March to September 2016). This programs involves private assets such as covered bonds (safe form of debt issued by banks), ABS and public debt (bonds of national government and European institutions). However, unlike the Fed, the ECB will have to seek them in the secondary market; in other words, find the banks that will sell them these bonds. And Draghi’s (and Co.) problem here is that the ECB may face unwilling sellers. As some of you know, banks’ treasury desks usually buy short-term bonds and use government debt as a liquidity buffer: regulators require banks to hold high-quality liquid assets – HQLAs – against future cash outflows in periods of market stress. As some of you may know, most bonds issued by banks are excluded as they may prove illiquid during a financial crisis; however, the eligibility requirements imposed on government bonds look loose. Therefore, this implies that that government bonds currently represent a considerable portion of bank assets.

In the European Union, there are two new ratios:

  • Liquidity Coverage Ratio LCR, requiring banks to hold a stock of liquid assets for an amount covering the net liquidity outflows which might be experienced, under stressed condition, over the following 30 days,
  • Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR), which requires that the amount of available stable funding (i.e. portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over a one-year time horizon) should be at least equal to the required amount of stable funding or the matching assets (i.e. illiquid assets which cannot be easily turned into cash over the following 12 months).

These two ratios were enacted through a Capital Requirements Directive (CDR4) and Regulation (CRR) issued in June 2013. Based on the Basel 3 documents, liquid assets in the LCR should mainly consists of:

  • Cash
  • Central bank reserves (including required reserves)
  • Marketable securities representing claims on or guaranteed by sovereign, central banks, PSEs, BIS, IMF, the ECB and European Community, or multilateral development banks
  • Bonds issued by non-financial firms and covered bonds with a rating at least equal to AA, subject to a 15% haircut and a 40% concentration limit

The two questions now that comes to my mind are:

  1. Who will sell those bonds to the ECB?
  2. Suppose the ECB offers good prices (i.e. good realized PnL for bond trading desks), what will traders do with this new cash with a deposit rate now at -0.2%?

Disappointing ECB could lead to Euro strength…

To conclude, I think there is potential risk that the ECB disappoints the market in March based on their purchases as the central bank won’t find the liquidity in the market. In my opinion, this scenario could play in favor of the single currency. My point is that we may see a bull consolidation before reaching the parity level that everyone seems to be talking about. The next couple of resistances to watch on the topside would be at 1.1530 and 1.1680.

Pocketful of Miracles…

It is sure that things are not easy negotiating with its ‘partners’ as time goes on. As Latin poet Publilius Syrus once said ‘A small debt produces a debtor; a large one, an enemy’. In this article, we are interested to see where the negotiations will go within the next few days.

First, let’s review quickly what is going on with Greek’s liabilities.


(Source: Bloomberg)

The pie chart above shows us who ‘owns’ Greece’s public debt. According to the country’s Statistical Authority, Greece’s total public debt amounted €315.5bn  at the end of the third quarter of last year, which corresponds to roughly 180% as a share of the country’s GDP. As you can see it, the EFSF, the EZ temporary crisis-fighting fund, lent the country €141.8bn (which represents 45% of it) and the current weighted average maturity is 32.38 years with the last payment due in August 2053 according to the fund’s website. As you may have heard at the end of last year, the Board of Directors of the EFSF decided to grant Greece a two-month technical extension. The program will end on February 28th instead of December 31st last year. As a result, the remaining amount available (1.8bn Euros, which will raise the total amount to 143.6bn Euros) could still be disbursed to Greece (in need of assistance) until the end of this month.

Another major ‘creditor’ of Greek’s debt is the ECB, as a result of the Security Markets Programme (SMP), which currently owns about €27bn (i.e. represents 40% of the €67.5bn marketable debt outstanding). However, whereas EFSF loans where principal payments don’t start until 2023, Greek is set to pay 6.7bn Euros held to the ECB this summer (20 July: €3.5bn, 20 August: €3.2bn).

Eventually, the IMF is also an important creditor with 25 billion Euros according to the fund’s website, maturing currently. IMF loans in February and March are €3.5bn. As a reminder, the IMF’s policy is to never restructure its loan.

Therefore, if we add up the Greek Loan Facility (Bilateral Loans), the ECB holdings, the EFSF loans and the outstanding IMF credit, we get 246.7bn Euros, that is to say 78.2% of the total public debt. How convincing will the new Tsipras government be ‘against’ those figures?

It has been a rough start for Greece: the country’s news has been making the headlines since (and before) the election of the new government (January 25th). PM Tsipras has made it clear that Greek debt is unsustainable, condemning the country to a state of perpetual economic recession and deflation, and is trying to negotiate a write off with its debt creditors. In addition to that, he unveiled last Sunday plans to undo several austerity measures: gradually increasing the minimum wage, dropping the recent property tax and promised the retirement age wouldn’t be change (anymore).

However, this will be the tricky part of the deal – asking for a write off while easing austerity measures – as they don’t (or never) come together usually. Negotiate a debt write off, press for a relaxation of economic austerity, avoid a bank run, and on the top of that, maintain a political stability. It is interesting to see that investors are considering political risks once again after more than two years of main attention to the ECB and its programs and promises.

However, as many of you, we would agree that the market is underestimating the consequences of a Grexit clearly, not only the costs, but also contagion to other ‘weak’ peripheral economies (i.e. Portugal). What would happen to the Euro if the spread between peripheral and core yields (good sovereign risk indicator) starts to rise once again (like in early 2012)?

Quick view on EURUSD:

EURUSD broke its small resistance at 1.1350 yesterday after a quiet week, and seems on its way to retest the 1.1500 level. We saw earlier this morning that EZ grew by 0.3% in the last quarter of 2014, meaning that the 19-bloc economy grew by 0.9% during 2014, better than the 0.8% expected (see details in Appendix). However, Greek FinMin is making the headlines this morning: ‘Haircut preferable to loan extension’, which is obviously ‘capping the pair on the topside. A good entry level would be above 1.1460 (if it makes it up there), with a stop above for 1.1530 and a take profit at 1.1300. You can also play the bigger range, setting your stop above 1.1650 and take profit at 1.1200. However, we wouldn’t recommend to be too ‘greedy’ ahead of the Eurogroup meeting on Monday.

Otherwise, we stay strongly bearish on the Euro in the long term (vs. USD and GBP), as growth, monetary policy divergence, Grexit contagion, geopolitical tensions will clearly weigh on the single currency.



(Source: EuroStat)

A CB surprise…

After October 15th last year, yesterday was another insane day in the market. We know approximately the impact of a lower (or higher) NFP report on the US dollar or a lower (resp. higher) than expected EZ inflation rate on Euro bonds; however when the surprise comes from a central bank, we saw the consequences…
But first, I am going to have just one quick digression before going for it, concerning the OMT.

OMT is legal

Almost a year ago, the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) found ECB’s OMT bond-buying program illegal and incompatible with EU and German law. Given that the GFCC only has jurisdiction on matters of German domestic law, it decided to leave judgement to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In his Opinion on Wednesday, the Advocate General Cruz Villalon observed that the program is compatible with the EU Law and that the ‘objectives are in principle legitimate and on consonant with monetary policy’. He added that the program is ‘necessary as well as proportionate in the strict sense, since the ECB does not assume a risk that will necessarily make it vulnerable to insolvency’. As a reminder, the Advocate General’s Opinion is not binding on the Court of Justice. THe judges are now deliberating and the Opinion is expected to reach its judgment by May.

The Euro plummeted by 100 pips to 1.1730 (9-year low) after the news, but came back above 1.1840 on the back of poor US retail sales figures. As a reminder, retail sales dropped 0.9% MoM on Wednesday, the most since June 2012, and missed expectations of a 0.1% decline.

However, the ‘recovery’ didn’t last very long as the single currency is currently trading at 1.1630 against the greenback. How come?

Definitely unexpected…

Yesterday morning, slightly before lunch time (Swiss local time), the Swiss National Bank announced that it was discounting the minimum exchange rate of 1.20 per Euro (that it has been ‘defending’ for the past 3-1/2 years). It also announced that it would go further into NIRP policy, pushing its interest rate on deposit balances to even more negative from -0.25% to -0.75%.

By letting the exchange rate float ‘naturally’, the consequence were brutal and EURCHF, which had been flirting with the 1.20 over the past couple of months, crashed to (less than) 75 cents per Euro, wiping out every single long EURCHF position, before ‘recovering’ to parity (now trading at 1.0140).


USDCHF is now trading around 0.8700 (back from above parity levels, 1.02 to be precise), and EURUSD was sold to 1.1568 before rebounding.

A Stressed Market

The Swiss curve is now trading in the negative territory for all the maturities until 10 years; the swiss market index tumbled to (less than) 8000 (almost 15 drawdown) and then stabilized around 8,400.

US yields are still compressing, with the 5-year, 10-year and 30-year trading at 1.18%, 1.72% and 2.37% respectively. I added a table below that shows the 10-year overall and definitely summaries the current ‘environment’. As you can see, Greece is the only EZ country where yields are trading at astronomic levels on the fear of a Grexit scenario in 10 days (See article here). I like the expression ‘the Japanization of Global Bond yields’ used by some analysts I read.

Capture d’écran 2015-01-16 à 10.35.47


Our favorites, AUDJPY and USDJPY, both reacted to the SNB comments ‘bringing down’ the equity market with them. AUDJPY plunged from (almost) 97 to 95.30 and is now trading at 95.60. USDJPY broke below 116.60 and dropped to 116.28; before that, it reached a daily high of 117.92 during the ‘early’ Asian hours.

The S&P500 index followed the general move and broke the 2,000 level (closing at 1,992), and is now trying to find a new low. Is it going to be a buy-on-dips scenario once again? Clearly, the equity market is ‘swingy’, however I don’t think we are about to enter a bearish momentum yet and I still see some potential on the upside. Therefore, USDJPY should also help the equity market levitate and we should see the pair back to 120.

Discrete poor US fundamentals

Yesterday was also marked by a poor jobless claims report in the US, which was totally forgotten of course but surged to 316K (vs. expectations of 290K). In addition, the Philly Fed, an index measuring changes in business growth, crashed from a 21-year high of 40.2 in November to 6.3 in January (missing expectations of 18.7), the lowest since 2014. I know these figures are quite not relevant for traders and investors, however I do think it is worth noticing it. As a reminder, US inflation rate (watched carefully by US policymakers) decreased from 1.7% to 1.3% in November and is expected to remain at low levels (between 1 and 1.5 percent).

Overall, the global economy still looks weak, and we saw lately that the World Bank decreased this year’s growth projections to 3% in 2015 (down from 3.4% last June). Major BBs declined their forecasts on oil and expect prices to remain low in the first half of this year. We heard Goldman’s Jeff Currie lately saying that prices of crude oil may fall below the bank’s 6-month forecast of $39 a barrel. Remember the chart I like to watch (oil vs. inflation vs. yields vs. equities).

The next couple of event to watch are of course the ECB meeting on January 22nd, followed by the Greek national elections on January 25 (see below). For the ECB meeting, it is hard to believe that the central bank will do nothing after the SNB’s announcement.


(Source: MS Research)

Quick update on the ‘Grexit’

Not only last year was a bad year for Greek market, Greece Athex is one of the worst 2014 performers (total return) with a 29% drawdown, but the country has suffered from political instability since the beginning of June. Since Syriza’s triumph in European elections on May 25th, the 10-year bond yield has soared from a low of 5.5% on June 10 to over 10% on ‘Grexit’ fears (the 3-year bond yields trading at 13.6%, up 10% over the past four months). The – Hellenic Republic – 5-year CDS, a good measure of the country’s default risk, is up more than 1000 bps, now trading around 1500bps. There has been some speculation of a possible ‘Grexit’ scenario; and as Der Spiegel news reported lately, German Chancellor Merkel is ‘prepared to let Greece leave the euro zone’ if the country abandons fiscal discipline and does not repay debts to its creditors.

2015: another difficult year for Greece

This year, according to Nomura’s analysts, Greece will face total payments (Principal + Interests) of 22.3bn Euros; €8bn scheduled to be paid to the ECB (mainly in July and August). As you can see it on the chart below published by Eurostat, which shows EuroZone debt and deficit by country, with a debt-to-GDP ratio standing at an all-time-high of 175% (despite the debt ‘haircut’ back in March 2012) and a deficit of 12.7% in 2013, there is no doubt that the country’s debt is unsustainable.

EZfiscal(Source: Eurostat)

There is nothing to stop it growing except haircuts, i.e. ‘partial’ default. Even though Greece’s recession has ended last year after almost six years of misery (the economy is now 30% less than in 2008), financial conditions (unemployment rate at 26% in total and 50% for youth, deflation for the past two years) will weigh on the economy longer than many analysts expect, especially now with the global macro conditions.

How strong is the anti-austerity party in Greece?

To sum up briefly the events of the past few weeks, Greece failed to approve a president (Stavros Dimas) nominated by PM Antonis Samaras as the number of votes didn’t reach 180 after three consecutive rounds (in the last round, 168 Greek lawmakers voted in favor of Dimas, 132 against). Therefore, as the Parliament failed to elect the President, Greek Constitution provides that the Parliament is being dissolved and snap earlier elections.
Greek elections will take place in a couple of weeks (on January 25) and the question is What could it look like?

In the last days of 2014, I remember that a first poll done by Alco for Proto Thema suggested that no party will have a clear majority in the new parliament (as one party will need roughly 35% of the Greek votes in order to gain an absolute majority). At that time, Syriza, a leftist anti-austerity party led by Alexis Tsipras, was ‘leading’ the league with 28% of the votes, followed by liberal-conservative New Democracy (ND) with 23%.

The market’s reaction was quite brutal as I said earlier as many investors fear that Greece may be forced to leave the Euro. The Syriza party wants to abandon the austerity measures imposed by the Troika as part of the €240bn bailout and wants a writedown on the nominal value of Greek Debt. I like the chart below (Source: Bloomberg) that gives you an idea of the government exposures to Greek’s public debt. The main bloc is held by official creditors (Euro-area governments: 62%; followed by the IMF, 10% and the ECB 8%). As you can see it in the chart, Germany is the major government-creditor of Athens and has more than €60bn in total exposure.

GreeceExpo(Source: Bloomberg Brief)

Greece bank shares (Alpha bank, Piraeus) all collapse over the past few weeks as fear of bank solvency and bank runs surged (Cyprus ‘bail-in’ regime continental template?). As a matter of fact, interruption of liquidity by the ECB to Greek banks will potentially lead to a ‘Cyprus type’ bank holiday.

Latest update: An article from the WSJ came up earlier this morning, and says that in nine separate opinion tools that were published in the Greek media in the last couple of days, Syriza is still on top and would garner ‘between 27.1% and 31.2%’ of the votes.

ECB meeting and consequences on the Euro.

As we know, any spike in Euro peripheral (or core) bond yields has usually bad consequences on the single currency. Even though Greece doesn’t represent a major risk for the 19-nation economy, I strongly believe Greece is and will be the ‘hot’ topic of the next couple of weeks (with the Yen as usual). And at the moment, Greece makes ECB policymakers’ life complicated, concerning the central bank’s introduction of its public QE in order to counter deflation now (yes, you read it, deflation of -0.2% in December).

EUR/USD broke its 1.20 psychological support earlier this year and is now trading slightly above 1.1800 (a 9-year low). The next support that traders will target now stands at 1.1640, which corresponds to 2005 low.

I don’t think the market will react aggressively at the next ECB meeting on January 22nd, and even though we don’t hear any update concerning its QE, the Euro is still capped on the topside. I added below a timeline from Morgan Stanley that sums up the Key risk events for the EZ this quarter.

EZrecaps(Source: MS Research)

Below is another chart posted by SG Research that shows the ‘global macro’ euro are agenda for January and the downside/upside risk scenarios. As you can see, it includes the (forgotten) OMT case with the European Court of Justice’s decision on the legality of the ECB program for sovereign bonds.


(Source: SG Research)